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Abstract
We review recent research about human subjectivity 
and self-consciousness that has focused on cognitive 
psychology and neuroimaging of bodily self-conscious-
ness. Multidisciplinary research on the fields of neurol-
ogy, cognitive neuroscience and virtual reality opens 
new avenues to investigate brain mechanisms under-
lying a fundamental sense of the bodily self. Clinical 
evidence for the implication of right temporo-parietal 
junction for bodily self-consciousness has received 
support by studies in which virtual-reality based own 
body illusions are evoked in healthy participants to 
study the underlying processes. A series of experiments 
will be reviewed in which it was shown that the ex-
periences of self-location, self-identification and the 
first-person perspective can be manipulated experi-
mentally and rely on the integration of multisensory 
stimuli (touch, vision, proprioception, vestibular infor-
mation). Specific protocols are available to predictably 
influence the different aspects of bodily self conscious-
ness. We predict that the understanding of fundamen-
tal brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness will 
lead to unprecedented empirical insights that are of 
broad relevance for science, virtual reality, engineer-
ing, the humanities, as well as medicine and psycho-
therapy.
A Neuroscience Approach to  
Subjective Experience
«The body is always there» (James, 1891) has be-
come a famous expression as it highlights the fact 
that the human brain continuously receives informa-
tion from the body (as opposed to vision or sound) 
which is afferent to the brain. All human beings are 
confined to a biological container (i.e. their body) in 
which subjective experience originates. French phi-
losopher René Descartes (1637) radically rejected 
the idea of unity between body and subjective ex-
perience when postulating his famous «Cogito ergo 
sum» (engl. «I think so I am»), which capitalized one 
of the major philosophical debates around the body-
mind problem. Dualists, such as Descartes, claim 
that body and mind are very distinct substances of 
very distinct quality. Most present philosophers and 
neuroscientists reject such dualist models and study 
the brain mechanisms underlying the self and self-
consciousness empirically or conceptually based on 
this data (for recent discussion see Metzinger, 2007).
Neuroscientists have always been fascinated by the 
scientific study of subjective experience and the re-
lated concepts of consciousness and awareness (e.g. 
Grüsser and Landis, 1991), but only recently a vast ar-
ray of experimental procedures has become available 
to study the brain mechanisms of self-consciousness. 
Previous cognitive neuroscience research on the self 
has focused on high-level aspects such as language, 
conceptual knowledge or memory. In the present re-
view we will highlight some recent discoveries relat-
ed to low-level contributions to self-consciousness, 
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the researcher, unseen by the participant, touches 
the back of participant’s body with a wooden stick. 
When the «felt stroking» on the back of the body 
is synchronous with the «seen stroking» on the vir-
tual body most participants experience strong self-
identification with the virtual body and report in 
questionnaires the sensation that the touch they felt 
was located where the touch was seen on the virtual 
body (illusory touch). After blindfolding partici-
pants, displacing them in the room and asking them 
to return to their initial position, most participants 
localized themselves about 25 cm closer to the vir-
tual body (illusory self-location). Participants are 
also presented to a second period of stimulation in 
which a delay is introduced between the video pro-
jection they see (virtual body) and the touch they 
feel (physical body), such that visuo-tactile stimula-
tion is asynchronous. In this condition, the subjec-
tive ratings and illusory self-location indicated by 
blind walking showed no bias towards the virtual 
body. These data show that synchrony of visual and 
tactile stimulation leads to an illusory self-identifi-
cation with and errors in self-location towards the 
virtual body. In other words, this experiment dem-
onstrates that two key aspects of bodily self-con-
sciousness (i.e. self-location and self-identification) 
depend on visuo-tactile signal integration and that 
this integration can be predictably manipulated in 
participants that do not suffer of any neurological 
or psychiatric impairment. These data extend neu-
rological data in providing further evidence for the 
idea that mechanisms of multisensory integration 
are important for bodily self-consciousness.
These findings were extended in other experiments 
by using the crossmodal congruency effect (CCE) 
during the full-body illusion paradigm (Aspell, 
Lenggenhager and Blanke, 2009). The CCE is a behav-
ioral measure that indicates whether or not a visual 
and a touch stimulus are perceived to be at identical 
spatial locations (Spence, Pavani and Driver, 1998). 
In the experiment participants are asked to indi-
cate where they perceived a single touch stimulus 
(i.e. short vibration) that could be applied just be-
low the shoulder or at the lower back. Distracting 
visual stimuli (i.e. short light flashes) were also pre-
sented on the back and either presented at the same 
or at a different position. Under these conditions, 
participants are faster to detect a touch stimulus 
if the visual distractor was presented at the same 
location (i.e. congruent trial) compared to touches 
co-presented with a more distanced visual distrac-
tor (i.e. incongruent trial; the CCE is calculated as 
the difference between reaction times of incongru-
ent versus congruent trials). In addition, the CCE is 
larger if the visual stimulus is closer in space to the 
such as the role of perception, multisensory and 
sensorimotor integration. Based on the reviewed 
findings Blanke and Metzinger (2009) proposed that 
a minimal phenomenal sense of self is based on the 
brain's integration of perceptual information from 
multiple senses, as for example from vision, touch 
and proprioception (i.e. information about the con-
figuration of the body in space).
This was largely based on clinical data in patients 
that suffered from specific neurologic or psychiatric 
impairments which show common phenomenol-
ogy of complex bodily hallucinations. One exam-
ple is the out-of-body experience, for which Blanke 
and Mohr (2005) identified three major character-
istics. First, a feeling of being located outside one’s 
body in an elevated position a few meters above the 
physical body (disembodiment), secondly a feeling 
of identification with this elevated body and finally 
a feeling of seeing the environment including the 
physical body from this elevated location. Converg-
ing evidence suggests that out-of-body experiences 
are caused by interference with the right temporo-
parietal junction (Blanke et al., 2002, 2004; Ionta et 
al., 2011). These experiences of disembodiment differ 
from other autoscopic hallucinations, during which 
patients see a double in external space but locate the 
self and perceive the world from within bodily bor-
ders (Blanke and Mohr, 2005). Partly based on this 
clinical evidence Blanke and Metzinger (2009) hy-
pothesized that bodily self-consciousness is funda-
mentally based on three aspects. First, experiencing 
the phenomenal self as being located in space – typi-
cally within bodily borders (self-location); secondly, 
attributing the self to the body as a whole – as op-
posed to body parts (self-identification); and finally, 
a spatial origin of subjective experience – which can 
be directed to the outside world (first-person per-
spective).
Experimentation with Self-Identification  
and Self-Location
A very fruitful approach for the scientific study of 
bodily self-consciousness and underlying mecha-
nisms has been to elicit bodily illusions in healthy 
participants and to study the underlying factors 
that allow these illusions to be evoked, maintained 
or abolished. One of these illusions is the so-called 
full-body illusion (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et 
al., 2007, 2009). In a typical full-body illusion experi-
ment a participant is standing in the experimenta-
tion room and is filmed by a video camera located 
a few meters behind the participant. The camera 
recording is transmitted to a head-mounted dis-
play by means of which the participant sees a back 
view projection of his or her own body a few me-
ters in front (virtual body). During the experiment 
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es related to bodily self-consciousness? Combining 
experimentation using full-body illusions with sub-
jective pain reports we found that changes in self-
identification and self-location are associated with 
an elevation of pain thresholds. Hänsel and cowork-
ers (2011) investigated whether pain thresholds for 
tactile pressure at the index finger are modulated 
during the full-body illusion. During synchronous 
or asynchronous backstroking participants received 
repeated touch pressure stimuli at the index fingers 
(with slowly increasing pressure levels) and were 
asked to report at which moment the stimulus felt 
painful. It was found that participants support more 
pain (increase in pain thresholds) during synchro-
nous stroking as compared to the asynchronous 
condition. The perception of pain was therefore 
decreased when participants self-identified with 
the virtual body. These data show that subjective 
experience of pain is associated with bodily self-
consciousness and is in line with reports of analgesic 
effects during anecdotal reports out-of-body expe-
riences (Thonnard, 2008).
How can the third hypothesized aspect of bodily 
self-consciousness, the experienced direction of the 
first-person perspective, be studied experimentally 
(for a related but distinct approach see Vogeley and 
Fink, 2003)? This was achieved in a recent study by 
Ionta and coworkers (2011) suggesting the relevance 
of vestibular (balance) signals. These authors involved 
participants in a full-body illusion experiment while 
lying on their backs (methods similar to Lenggenhag-
tactile stimulus. Importantly, if measured during 
the full-body illusion paradigm, it was found that 
the CCE magnitude reflects changes in bodily self-
consciousness (self-identification and self-location) 
and may thus function as a behavioral proxy of such 
changes. Thus, the CCEs differed between periods 
of synchronous stroking (i.e. high CCE, more effect 
of visual distracters on tactile discrimination) and 
asynchronous stroking (i.e. low CCE, less effect of 
visual distracters on tactile discrimination) showing 
that the spatial perception of tactile cues applied 
to the human skin changes when self-identification 
and self-location are altered. 
Up to now, the full-body illusion paradigm showed 
that in healthy humans there is the possibility to al-
ter bodily self-consciousness by inducing states of il-
lusory self-identification and self-location with a vir-
tual body, and that this is associated with changes in 
touch perception. However, vision and touch are not 
the only senses that convey information about the 
position of the body to the brain. In a different study 
Palluel, Aspell and Blanke (2011) used the full-body 
illusion to demonstrate that bodily signals about 
the position of the limbs in space (often referred 
to as proprioceptive information) are relevant for 
bodily self-consciousness. The researchers applied 
constant vibration stimulation at the ankles of par-
ticipants, which induced a perturbation of proprio-
ceptive leg signals carrying information about the 
spatial location of the body. Under these conditions 
the full-body illusion was diminished with respect 
to the classical illusion-inducing conditions and 
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation did not differ 
from asynchronous stimulation (this was reflected 
in CCE measures and subjective ratings, see figure 
1). However, if the vibration was applied to a differ-
ent body part (at the wrists) that was not relevant 
for spatial location of the body when standing, illu-
sory changes in self-identification were successfully 
evoked. This experiment shows that – as predicted 
based on own body illusions of neurological origin – 
visual, tactile, and proprioceptive cues and their in-
tegration are relevant for bodily self-consciousness 
(Blanke et al., 2002, 2004).
These and other results suggest that vision, touch 
and proprioception are sensory signals that are high-
ly relevant for the brain in order to rapidly update 
an online representation of the body in space (see 
also Maurer, Mergner and Peterka, 2006). Another 
important sensory signal from the body is pain, also 
because it is notoriously more than merely percep-
tual and pain is characterized by a high inter- and in-
tra-individual variability. Can subjective changes of 
pain experience be modulated by subjective chang-
Figure 1 Ankle vibration experiment. Left panel shows experimental setup. A 
participant (black trousers) is filmed from a few meters behind and sees a vid-
eo projection of this recording on a head-mounted display, resulting in seeing 
a virtual body (grey trousers) a few meters in front. Vibrators for continious 
stimulation are attached to the ankles of the participant (white cuffs). Four light-
attached vibrators for the crossmodal congruency task are attached  to the back 
of the participant (white squares). Tactile stroking at the participant’s back is 
manually applied by means of a wooden stick (black rod). Right panel shows 
experimental results. Crossmodal-congruency effect (CCE in ms) is plotted as a 
function of experimental condition. Note that there was no difference between 
synchronous and asynchronous back stroking conditions if continuous ankle vi-
bration was applied. However, if no vibration was present, the typical illusion-
related CCE-difference was found (see also Aspell et al., 2009).
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etal junction (TPJ), that showed specific modulation 
of activity in line with the behavioral dissociation be-
tween Up- and Down-group and the specific direc-
tion of drift. This is the first study to show that activ-
ity in bilateral TPJ in healthy human beings reflects 
changes in experienced self-location and direction 
of the first-person perspective. It is also in line with 
earlier clinical research associating damage in right 
TPJ to such changes during out-of-body experiences 
(Blanke et al., 2002, 2004). 
Conclusions and Beyond
In the present review we argue that the clinical find-
ings of a causal link between damage to right tempo-
ro-parietal cortex and complex body illusions with 
their characteristic changes in self-identification, 
self-location and the first-person perspective, can be 
extended to the research laboratory. We reviewed 
empirical studies that systematically investigated 
similar mechanisms in healthy participants, and we 
suggest that this approach will allow the study of 
fundamental properties of bodily self-consciousness 
in a more fine-grained scientific manner. In utiliz-
ing variations of the full-body illusion paradigm in 
healthy participants, it is now clear that specific mul-
tisensory integration in the brain - relying on visual, 
tactile, proprioceptive, and vestibular cues - encodes 
key aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Predictable 
experimental control over bodily self-consciousness 
will enable scientists and engineers to extend their 
investigations to other aspects of consciousness (e.g. 
to the question: What are the consequences for vis-
ual consciousness if bodily self-consciousness is ma-
nipulated?) as well as to linguistic, conceptual, and 
mnestic aspects of the self and consciousness. Im-
portantly, such research can now be combined with 
all major brain imaging techniques (for example Ion-
ta et al., 2011; Lenggenhager et al., 2011; Petkova et 
al., 2011) generating a new field within the cognitive 
neurosciences dedicated to study the neurobiology 
of self-consciousness. As there is a growing interest 
in virtual reality for education (i.e. of surgeons, fire-
men, pilots) or psychotherapy (i.e. for treating pho-
bia, post-traumatic-stress-disorder) these findings 
on self-identification and embodiment of avatars is 
likely to be useful to further refine such applications 
for virtual education and treatments and may help 
improving the representation of the user in virtual-
reality systems to increase efficacy of virtual reality 
use for it’s dedicated demand. The merger of these 
approaches may also lead to specific sensory treat-
ment protocols that may help to diminish the suffer-
ing of chronic pain patients. 
er, 2009). About half of the participants experienced 
a direction of the first-person perspective that was 
congruent with their physical up-looking perspec-
tive (Up-group), whereas the remaining half of the 
participants had the impression to be looking down 
in line with the visual perspective on the virtual 
body that was used to induce the full-body illusion 
(Down-group; thus the direction of gravity of the vir-
tual body was different than the direction of gravity 
conveyed by vestibular information; visuo-vestibular 
conflict). Both groups showed higher self-identifi-
cation towards the virtual body under conditions 
of visuo-tactile synchrony. An adapted self-location 
measure showed results that were compatible with 
these group differences in the experienced direction 
of the first-person perspective. Specifically, the direc-
tion of the drift in self-location was congruent with 
the experienced direction of the first-person per-
spective, but, in addition, participants in the Down-
group had a generally higher level of self-location 
than the participants of the Up-group (see figure 2). 
Finally, both groups showed higher self-identification 
towards the virtual body under conditions of visuo-
tactile synchrony, as compared to the asynchronous 
condition. This data showed that participants may 
experience self-location either predominantly based 
on signals from their own physical body (Up- group; 
based on vestibular and/or somatosensory cues) or 
based on visual signals from the seen virtual body 
(Down- group). Concurrent neuroimaging during 
the experiment revealed right and left temporo-pari-
Figure 2 First-person perspective experiment. The central column shows the 
 experimental setup. A participant is lying on a robotic device for tactile  stroking 
on the back (grey rectangle). A pre-recorded video is presented on a head-
mounted display showing visual stroking on a body from a few meters distance 
(within black square). Visuo-tactile stroking was presented in synchronous or 
asynchronous fashion. Left and right column represent results for experienced 
self-location of participants (Up-Group, Down-Group) for the different stroking 
conditions (S for synchronous, A for asynchronous), reflecting an upward  drift 
for Up-Group participants and a downward drift for Down-Group  participtants. 
See main text and Ionta et al. (2011) for more information.
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